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Of Drones and Justice
A Just War Theory Analysis of the United States’ Drone Campaigns
By Ethan A. Wright
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Introduction
Drones are at the forefront of high-tech warfare. New technology always calls
into question how we ought to make judgments, especially with regards to war.
Unmanned aerial vehicles (UAVs), typically called “drones”, have revolutionized
warfare, allowing aerial surveillance and armed attacks to reach farther than ever
contemplated with manned aircraft. This has not only opened up new strategic and
tactical frontiers, but also has borne foggy questions about law, diplomacy, and especially
ethics. As technology grants us new capabilities, it may be tempting to adopt new moral
rules. It will be shown that the use of drones does not require us to retreat from
conventional wartime ethics, usually called Just War theory. A primary question raised,
which this paper seeks to answer, is whether or not the United States’ recent use of drone
strikes has been ethical in accordance with Just War theory. Under traditional Just War
principles, drone strikes outside of active combat zones, without knowledge of the
target’s identity, should be condemned as immoral and unjust.
Literature Review
There is a wealth of scholarship on Just War theory. Generally accepted tenets
include: Enemy soldiers may be killed, while civilians may not; the intent of a war, and
subsequent military action, is relevant to its moral evaluation; proportionality is a
significant factor in judging the morality of a military response; and international law has
deep roots in the Just War tradition, and tends to reflect it. The history of drones is also
widely documented. Though few sources have taken the trouble to establish a thorough
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timeline of all drone strikes, details are available on some of the earliest strikes, their
targets, and their frequency over time leading up to the present.
In addition, many authors have taken up the challenge of considering the
problems that drone technologies pose for traditional Just War principles. Many authors
have been quick to point out how drones force us to adopt new perspective. A frequently
noted problem that remains largely unanswered in the literature is that of determining
whether or not drone operators are combatants. On this topic, no consensus appears in the
literature. Other common concerns include the necessity and proportionality of drone
tactics.
Conspicuously absent in the literature on drones and Just War theory is simplest
combination of the two subjects: has the United States’ use of drones been consistent
with Just War principles? It should be noted that many have written thoughtful analyses
on the problems that are presented by drones with respect to Just War theory. Few
scholars, however, take a definitive stance as to whether or not the U.S. policy of drone
warfare has been just. Most scholars who have taken up that torch hold that American
drone warfare is unwise, but the bulk of that literature regards cost-benefit analysis, and
still avoids questions of justice.
A Summary of Just War Theory
Just War theory formalizes the moral justifications for war. It is a lens fixed in the
Western philosophical tradition.1 It primarily seeks to answer two questions of justice2:
Whether or not the decision to go to war is moral, i.e. if the cause is just; and whether or
not actions in wartime are moral. The first is typically referred to as jus ad bellum, while
1
2
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the second is known as jus in bello. There is a third category – jus post bellum – which
refers to questions of justice after the conflict has ended. However, most scholarship on
Just War concerns only the first two, and this essay follows suit.
Historically, self-defense has been advanced as the only just cause for going to
war, though some scholars also contend that humanitarian intervention is compatible with
Just War principles.3 At the outset of conflict, this question can often be easy to answer –
all it typically requires is knowledge of which actor became violent first. However, as
conflict continues, this question remains pertinent. Continual reflection is necessary to
determine whether or not it is moral to expand a war beyond its original scope, and
whether or not its original cause has disintegrated.
Because Just War theory specifically deals with the violent conflict of war, most
of jus in bello analysis is with reference to whom one is allowed to kill, and who is off
limits. The typical distinction is between “combatants”, who may be the targets of
wartime operations, and “non-combatants”, who are exempt from being targets of such
attacks.4 This is known as the principle of discrimination. Put simply, only those engaged
in the conflict are legitimate targets. “Combatant” traditionally refers to a soldier, but
over the twentieth century, as the face of war has changed, that definition has become
more complicated. The original conceptions of Just War theory, first formulated centuries
ago, were designed for “total warfare, for conventional wars fought between the armies
of two states.”5 War in the twentieth century has been a radical departure from war
throughout most of history, though. Since World War II, we have seen the rise of
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guerrilla warfare, international terrorist cells, nuclear weapons, and paramilitary groups.
The changing nature of war has required reflection on the principles behind the
distinctions of Just War theory. As such, contemporary definitions tend to focus more on
whether or not a target is a military threat, as opposed to whether or not he or she is a
soldier in uniform, which was the traditional distinction. “Non-combatant” refers to
someone not engaged in the conflict, or at least not enough to warrant attacking them on
sight. In contrast to the diminishing certainty in deciding exactly who is a combatant, the
definition of non-combatant, or civilian, remains much the same as it did a century ago.
Two other principles drive jus in bello analysis: proportionality and necessity.6
Proportionality is the notion that damage inflicted should be commensurate with the
military value of the target, including any collateral damage. Targets that pose more
extreme threats may justify a greater response. If the terrorist attacks on September 11th
had only killed ten people, the American retaliation against Al-Qaeda would have been so
grossly disproportionate to the damage caused. Proportionality should not be interpreted
in a strictly quantitative sense. Proportional responses should take into account two
factors: how much damage was caused, and how that figure informs the future potential
to deal damage. The first is a retributive factor, while the second is a determination of
threat. All military responses must take these factors into account before action, and
disproportionate responses are unethical under Just War.
Necessity is the idea that the target must present a great enough threat that attack
is necessary for the security of a nation. If the objectives can be accomplished without
resorting to violence, then to use violent means would be unethical. The threat must be of
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such a nature that only military force can adequately meet it. These can mean that other
forms of dispute resolution, such as diplomacy, have failed, or perhaps were never
feasible to begin with. If an objective is not necessary for the defeat of the enemy or
securing one’s nation, that objective is unethical.
Just War theory grows out of a philosophical tradition that holds individuals as
having intrinsic moral value. This means every individual is an end in and of herself.7 As
such, people are not obstacles to a greater goal, such as winning a war. People are not
means to an end. Targets are only legitimate under Just War theory by virtue of who they
are and what they are doing, not group identifiers such as nationality. For example,
deliberately targeting German civilians in World War II, who were not component to the
German war machine, would have been a violation of Just War principles without
contention.
Questions of legality, material cost, and political consequence might guide a
military decision-making process, and their answers may decide whether or not an action
is permissible; however, these questions have no influence in deciding whether or not an
action is ethical, and should thus be ignored in such a determination. International law
regarding warfare is heavily informed by Just War principles, though.8 As such, looking
for adherence to international law can actually be a good place to start in evaluating
whether something is ethical under Just War theory. If a group is acting in violation of
international law in war, its activity is likely in conflict with Just War principles, and
deserves scrutiny.
A Survey of Drone Warfare
7
8
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Two drone programs are operated by the United States at present. The first is
operated by the Department of Defense (DoD), and the second by the Central Intelligence
Agency (CIA).9 The DoD program operates semi-publicly and complies with the Laws of
International Armed Conflict, International Humanitarian Laws, and the Standard
Operating Procedures of the DoD.10 The CIA program, in contrast, is not considered a
military program, is not operated as one, and is not governed “by the same international
protocols on the conduct of war” as the DoD.11 The clandestine and largely
unaccountable nature of the CIA program creates the most problems for Just War. As
stated earlier, a strong adherence to international law and accepted principles is often the
headwater for taking ethical action under Just War theory. Because the CIA program is
far more clandestine and is not necessarily governed by such principles, its activities are
of graver concern.
The CIA’s criteria for selecting drone strike targets are kept largely classified.12
However, many scholars have been able to discern useful distinctions used by the CIA.
There are two types of strikes – “signature strikes” and “personality strikes.”13
Personality strikes are attacks against specific, known individuals. They require a high
degree of confidence that the target is present. Signature strikes, on the other hand, are
made against individuals or groups whose identities have not been discerned. Instead,
they match a “signature”, or behavior that the United States believes links them to
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“military activity or association.”14 What constitutes signature behavior remains unknown
to the public, as the United States has not yet declassified the documents outlining the
standards. Signature strikes are the most common. For example, the majority of strikes in
Pakistan fall into this strike category.15
The modern use of drones has been almost entirely defined by strikes against
terrorist targets overseas. As such, when plotting a timeline of U.S. drone strikes, an
appropriate place to begin is the first strike against a terrorist target. One of the earliest
such recorded strikes was made in Yemen in 2002, against Al Qaeda.16 Since that first
strike, the three theaters of covert drone strike operations by the United States have been
in Yemen, Pakistan, and Somalia. The following estimates come from the Bureau of
Investigative Journalism (BoI), regarding the deaths and injuries from the drone
campaigns in these three theaters:17
Pakistan (2004 – 2014)
•

Total killed: 2,400-3,888

•

Civilians killed: 416-959

•

Children killed: 168-204

•

Injured: 1,133-1,706

Yemen (2002 – 2014)

14

•

Total killed: 371-541

•

Civilians killed: 64-83

•

Children killed: 7

Ibid, 8
Ibid, 9
16
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•

Injured: 81-199

Somalia (2007 – 2014)
•

Total killed: 6-9

•

Civilians killed: 0-1

•

Children killed: 0

•

Injured: 2-3
The numbers reported paint one of the few pictures of the scale of these

operations and their casualties. Children are of interest in these statistics because while it
can sometimes be difficult to distinguish between combatants and noncombatants after
their demise, children can safely be assumed to be innocent bystanders. Pakistan is the
most extreme example, so let’s break it down to show just the kind of scenario the drone
campaign there creates. Assuming that all of the reported non-civilian deaths are enemy
militants, what follows shows why these operations are worth scrutinizing under the lens
of Just War theory.18 Under the most generous estimates (maximum militant deaths and
minimum civilian deaths), the portion of civilian casualties is just under 11%. Under the
most pessimistic estimates (minimum militant deaths and maximum civilian deaths), the
portion of civilian casualties rises to 40%. These numbers raise the issue of
proportionality. Conventional wisdom is that some civilian casualties may be justified in
war, but only up to a point. A few such casualties may be accidental, but too many

18

The Bureau of Investigative Journalism estimates that the bulk of those killed fall into the category of
“alleged militants”. The Bureau is reasonably certain that those it classifies as civilians are indeed not
combatants, but because there is no evidence available to prove the militant status of the dead, they are only
able to report total deaths, and are unable to confirm whether or not the targets were in fact terrorists. For
more on their methodology, see: http://www.thebureauinvestigates.com/2011/08/10/pakistan-drone-strikesthe-methodology2/
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constitutes reckless behavior. Such negligent destruction of innocent life is reprehensible,
and killing civilians calls into question just how proportional a military response is.
This picture is relevant to the Just War analysis primarily for more reasons. First,
knowing that there are civilian casualties of these operations, and that such casualties
potentially make up a disturbingly high proportion of those killed, immediately raises
ethical questions. Second, not all combatants are created equal, so we must be sure that
they are worth the loss of innocent life. Some targets have a much higher military value
than others, and pose greater threats. Not all targets merit the sacrifice of noncombatants.
In fact, it should go without saying that few do.
Before properly delving into the problems that drones create for a Just War
analysis, it is important to first understand the distinct advantages that drones offer.
Drones are legitimate weapons of war: they are not indiscriminate, nor do they cause
unnecessary suffering.19 They ought not be dismissed outright as unethical weaponry.
Drones eliminate many of the human costs on for the forces using them, perhaps the
clearest and most attractive justification for their use. Through the use of drone
technology, we are able to accrue intelligence and engage military targets without risking
life or limb to our soldiers. Some scholars also contend that removing pilots from harm’s
way allows drone operators to more “carefully evaluate a situation without combat fears
and anxiety.”20 Some even argue that recording technology used by drones makes it
easier to hold operators accountable for their actions than traditional pilots, and better
gauge the military’s adherence to the laws of war and the principles of Just War.21
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Problems Drones Create in Just War Theory
There are two pertinent questions that drone strikes raise under Just War theory:
(1) Are drone operators combatants?
(2) Have the United States’ drone strike targets in the War on Terror been ethical?
The first is raised because technology such as drones has never existed before, and a new
analysis is necessary. The second is the direct application of the ethical principles that
have been previously discussed.
The fact that drone operators are not physically in a theater of war blurs
traditional distinctions. Drone operators are in civilian population centers, leading civilian
lives outside of their occupation. Unlike regular soldiers, drone operators retire at the end
of the day. A drone operator’s duties are not constant like those of a soldier. They are
more akin to stereotypical employment where you come in to work each day, gathering
intelligence, and executing strikes when required.
The situation described closely mirrors the targeted drone strikes by the United
States to eliminate terror suspects. If you remain a combatant even when you re-enter
civilian life and cease to be an active threat, then an attack on our drone operators –
again, leading civilian lives in civilian homes – would be legitimate. On the other hand, if
we find that you become a civilian when you return to civilian life and cease to be an
active threat, the American drone strikes against terrorist suspects who are not active
military threats would be immoral.
In order to answer question (2), we must first evaluate if the targets of U.S. drone
strikes are so valuable as to justify the deaths of noncombatants, since we know we are
inflicting civilian casualties. Had we needed to annihilate a small home of five or ten
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innocents to kill Osama bin Laden, it would not have been difficult to justify under Just
War. The amount of collateral damage needs to incorporate how much of a threat is being
posed. Given his crimes, and the significant threat he posed, some civilian deaths likely
would be justifiable, however regrettable. A hundred innocent deaths, though, would be
far more difficult to justify. A thousand would be even more challenging. Loss of
innocent life is a timeless fact of war. Harming innocents cannot be an end in itself, but
may be held permissible as a foreseeable but unintended consequence of an otherwise
just action.22 Civilian casualties can be justified under Just War theory; however, there
are situations in which the civilian sacrifice is so disproportionate that it is impossible to
validate.
Consider a target that is not as great a threat as Osama bin Laden. If our target is a
low-level Taliban operative, who has killed American soldiers and plots to do so again,
we ought to establish if he is worth risking civilian lives? What if our target only supplies
intelligence to Al Qaeda, has never pointed a gun at an American, and never intends to?
Given that we know the drone operations have resulted in sizable civilian casualties, it is
of upmost importance that the military value – and identity – of our targets be properly
evaluated.
Ethics of American Drone Policy
In answering question (1), the only reachable conclusion under Just War theory is
that drone operators ought to be considered combatants. Among the most important
considerations in evaluating combatant status is the threat that one carries; arguably, this
consideration is paramount. If an actor were not a threat, justifying his or her death under
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Just War theory would appear impossible, as such a person would by definition to fall
into the category of non-combatant. This can be broken down into two parts: What kind
of threat is posed, and when the threat is posed. The only threat that can merit killing is
one of physical violence. Other threats, such as those of a psychological nature, might
merit military action, but in order to justify execution, a threat must be extreme and
potentially irreparable. Before we engage in killing another human being we must be sure
that to leave that person alive means leaving other lives in danger. In other words, the
threat creates the ultimate us-or-them scenario: either we will die, or they will die. Perfect
certainty is always too much to ask for in war, but to even begin to satisfy Just War
principles, we must at least be reasonably sure of the threat posed.
Under Just War theory, drone operators threaten human life. So long as they are at
the controls, the armed drones under their command pose a direct and deadly threat to
their enemies. In order to justify killing over other means of neutralization, a threat must
be active. An active threat is one in which the actor is in the process of endangering lives.
Drone operators clearly present an active threat to their enemies while at the controls, but
when they leave to go home, are they an imminent threat that merits elimination? To
answer this, let’s set up a hypothetical.
Consider a scenario in which you know someone is about to enlist in an enemy
military force. You have reasonable certainty that she will soon be a soldier in the enemy
army. However, she is not yet a soldier. Killing her in order to prevent her from
becoming a soldier, and therefore a threat, seems immediately unethical. Until she
becomes a soldier, is trained, armed, and ready to obey orders, there is nothing about her
that is threatening. The reason for this is that the requirements for killing her haven’t yet
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manifested. What justifies taking a life in wartime is the reasonable expectation that the
target’s presence threatens the lives of others. Until that threat manifests, by definition,
those lives are not in danger. The us-or-them situation hasn’t yet come to pass, and
therefore taking another human life cannot be justified.
When they finish their day, drone operators cease to be active threats, as they no
longer have the capacity to do harm. The thing that made them an active threat – control
over a military drone – is stripped away. Without that kind of force available, they
become identical to civilians in all but their intentions, which are insufficient to justify
their deaths. In sum, drone operators must be considered combatants while at the controls
due to the active threat they present to their adversaries, but afterwards, upon returning to
their civilian lives, their disconnect must be respected and they must be considered noncombatants during that time.
This conclusion, however, produces difficulties in answering question (2).
Especially with the signature strikes of the CIA, the magnitude of the threat presented by
a drone target is often uncertain. Using the principles that establish an actor as a
legitimate target (i.e., a combatant), we can craft two scenarios that will further illustrate
the circumstances under which a killing is just.
First is a scenario akin to a personality strike, in which the target is known and
has a history. Suppose this target has previously attacked our country, threatened our
people, and continues to plot against us. Based upon what we know about the target, we
can reasonably conclude that his dangerous activities in the past will continue into the
future, and he is therefore a threat. This can be summed up as the assassin’s justification:
the target has proven to be dangerous, and based upon past behavior we know with
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reasonable certainty that this target will continue to be so. There is a caveat to this,
however. As was previously stated, killing requires that there be no other feasible option.
Therefore, it must first be shown that the threat cannot be neutralized by anything short of
killing.
The second scenario concerns a target whose identity is not known; we know only
his context: his current activities, location, etc. Based upon a target’s context, we can
reasonably infer whether or not he will threaten us in the foreseeable future. Consider a
soldier in the enemy’s camp, and that we can discern from our knowledge of the enemy
that their soldiers are deployed to kill us. As such, any one of their soldiers qualifies as a
threat, even if they are not in that moment firing upon us. Let this be called the warzone
justification: all enemy soldiers are threats; the target is an enemy soldier; ergo the target
is a threat. As a result, taking a first strike would be just, knowing that the target’s
continued existence threatens our wellbeing. The warzone justification is rarely so cleancut in modern warfare, of course. Terrorists rarely fly colors or wear uniforms. They
often dress as civilians and organize themselves in civilian population centers. However,
even factoring these facts in, there are still criteria that would allow us to reasonably
discern a target is in fact an enemy combatant.
The United States’ targeted personality strikes by drones definitely fall within the
purview of the assassin’s justification. There are arguments for whether or not such
tactics are prudent, but they seem to qualify as just under the lens of Just War theory.
Signature strikes, unsurprisingly, are where the problems manifest. It’s conceivable that
signature strikes could be validated using the warzone justification. However, the
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warzone justification only suffices when one has met a certain threshold of contextual
information. Therefore, it is a question of facts independent of the target.
There are two reasons that the official justifications for signature strikes sound
suspect at best. First, the processes by which signatures are established and assigned are
kept classified. We have absolutely no official insights, therefore, into why the United
States sees fit to kill these individuals. We only know that they are suspected terrorists.
So our options are to either trust the government entirely when it claims that it has found
terrorists, or remain skeptical and demand more evidence.
Second, many of the strikes occur in civilian centers, often isolated from the
general population. The majority of strikes in Pakistan, for example, happen in villages in
North and South Waziristan, rural areas for which outsider access is difficult.23 If we had
more detailed information as to how signature targets are chosen, then attacking bombing
small villages would be easier to comprehend. Conversely, if the attacks were being
carried out on more obvious military centers, rather than rural villages, it would be easier
to believe that the justification was rational. However, missing these crucial data means
that the most prudent option is skepticism until more information is found. As a result,
we cannot declare the signature strikes as just.
This same problem – lack of public information – means that signature strikes
continue to fail on two more fronts, too: necessity and proportionality. Without public
information on what constitutes a signature – to use CIA parlance – for militancy, we
have no way of gauging the nature and magnitude of a threat being posed, and whether or
not the use of military force is necessary to neutralize that threat. Similarly, without the
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criteria for such a signature it’s impossible to estimate proportionality; we are missing an
understanding of the target’s past actions that merit retribution, and we cannot understand
how those actions indicate a future threat. So ultimately, the signature strikes fail to
uphold all three jus in bello principles necessary for just warfare.
But even if the signature strikes met all three jus in bello criteria, there is
considerable reason to question the legitimacy of the war on terror in the first place. The
movement to avenge the United States for the September 11th attacks has long since
evolved into a global war on radical Islamic terrorism. The justification for this war has
been that of pre-emptive self-defense. Law professor Mary O’Connell asserts that this
justification runs counter to international laws of self-defense: “The law of self-defense
does not permit states to attack before they possess evidence of armed attack occurring –
evidence of plots does not suffice.”24 Even if the self-defense was considered legitimate,
however, the logic that the United States may kill terrorist threats at will, regardless of
national boundaries, leads to unsettling conclusions. If we can kill terrorists in Pakistan
and Yemen, why not in Germany, the United Kingdom, or even the United States itself?25
The calculus of the argument does not change simply because the target is an American
citizen. Yet to treat citizens the way we have treated terrorists overseas would completely
contradict due process, which itself is a cornerstone of the liberal democracy we claim to
defend.
The United States government has taken such concerns to their logical extreme
already. In late 2011, Anwar al Awlaki, a Yemeni imam and Islamic militant, and his 17year old son Abdulrahman were both killed in separate drone attacks. Both were
24
25
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American citizens.26 In the memo outlining the legal justification for such action, the
Justice Department claimed that joining the “forces of the enemy” overrode the
protections offered by domestic law, made that person an enemy of the state, and a
legitimate military target.27 Such a precedent is exceptionally dangerous; allowing a state
to selectively execute its own citizens unilaterally and without due process of law is
grossly unethical. Those precedents that lead to such an outcome would be by extension
unethical, and thus unjust. And if the war itself is not just, then the jus in bello concerns
are moot.
Conclusion
There is little evidence that the signature strikes carried out by the United States at
all adhere to the Just War principles of discrimination, necessity, and proportionality, and
what evidence we do have should encourage skepticism, not optimism. These concerns
stand even if the government is given the benefit of the doubt and we assume that the war
is only jus ad bellum, though there is reason not to give that luxury. The burden of proof
is on the government of the United States to show that it has not been engaging in unjust,
unethical warfare. Lacking that information, it is nigh impossible to condone the
signature strikes as just. The government has failed to meet that burden, and the only
remaining conclusion is that our campaign of signature strikes in the War on Terror is
largely, if not wholly, immoral under the theory of Just War.

26
27

Nääf, 20
Lauter & Phelps, Los Angeles Times

19

Bibliography
Blank, Laurie R. "After "Top Gun": How Drone Strikes Impact the Law of War." Journal of
International Law 33.3 (2012): 675-718. Web.
Currier, Cora. "Everything We Know So Far About Drone Strikes." ProPublica. ProPublica, 5
Feb. 2013. Web. 18 Nov. 2014. <http://www.propublica.org/article/everything-we-knowso-far-about-drone-strikes>.
"Get the Data: Drone Wars | The Bureau of Investigative Journalism." The Bureau of
Investigative Journalism. The Bureau of Investigative Journalism, n.d. Web. 15 Nov.
2014. <http://www.thebureauinvestigates.com/category/projects/drones/dronesgraphs/>. Updated regularly to reflect accurate figures.
Fixdal, Mona, and Dan Smith. “Humanitarian Intervention and Just War.” Mershon
International Studies Review 42.2 (1998): 283-312.
Lauter, David, and Timothy A. Phelps. "Memo Justifying Drone Killing of American Al Qaeda
Leader Is Released." Los Angeles Times. Los Angeles Times, 23 June 2014. Web. 1 Dec.
2014. <http://www.latimes.com/nation/nationnow/la-na-nn-drone-memo-awlaki20140623-story.html>.
Leahy, Mary-Kate. “Keeping Up With the Drones: Is Just War Theory Obsolete?” U.S. Army
War College Carlisle Barracks (2010).
May, Larry. “War Crimes and Just War.” Journal of Military Ethics 7.4 (2007): 91-108. Web.
Miller, Greg. "Plan for Hunting Terrorists Signals U.S. Intends to Keep Adding Names to Kill
Lists." Washington Post. The Washington Post, 23 Oct. 2012. Web. 1 Dec. 2014.
<http://www.washingtonpost.com/world/national-security/plan-for-hunting-terroristssignals-us-intends-to-keep-adding-names-to-kill-lists/2012/10/23/4789b2ae-18b3-11e2a55c-39408fbe6a4b_story.html>.
Nääf, Amanda. "Droning toward a Shift in the Morality of War? A Just War Approach to the
United States Use of Drones in the War on Terror." Thesis. Lund University, 2011. Print.

20

O'Connell, Mary E. "Drones under International Law." (2010): 1-9. Washington University
Law. Whitney R. Harris World Law Institute. Web.
<http://law.wustl.edu/harris/documents/OConnellFullRemarksNov23.pdf>.
Picek, Joseph. "Technology, Ethical Responsibility, and Blameworthiness in Just War Theory:
The Case of Drones." (2014): n. pag. Western Political Science Association. Western
Political Science Association. Web.
<http://wpsa.research.pdx.edu/papers/docs/Technology,%20Ethical%20Responsibility,%
20and%20Blameworthiness%20in%20Just%20War%20Theory.pdf>.
Schiel, Rebecca. In the War on Terror, Can the Use of Drones Be Consistent With Just War
Theory? Thesis. University of Massachusetts, 2013. Boston: McCormak Graduate School
of Policy and Global Studies, 2013. Web.
Shah, Naureen, et al., The Civilian Impact of Drones: Unexamined Costs, Unanswered
Questions. Rep. New York: Columbia Law School, 2012. Print. Produced by the Human
Rights Clinic at Columbia Law School and the Center for Civilians in Conflict.

